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Game Spirituality: How Games Tell Us More than We Might Think
In a world that includes such global problems as poverty, war, hunger, greed, and crime
we would not be out of line to feel depressed, pessimistic, and overwhelmed by what we
encounter every day. Yet we often do not feel this way. In fact, we often find great joy and
meaning in our lives. The monotony of our workaday lives is often interrupted or overcome by
those activities that speak to us on a deeper level. Religion has filled this void for many people
because it gives something transcendent to live for. Games have served a similar role for many
people, as well. While we often see games as less serious or at least less transcendental than
religion there is reason to believe that games can evoke similarly meaningful narratives that
allow us to learn a great deal about ourselves and our world. And games do so often using the
same symbolic and metaphorical mechanisms that generate meaning in religious experience.
Many scholars claim that we understand much of the happenings in our world through
myth or mythical ideas.1 Others have argued that we understand much of the happenings in our
world through games.2 In this paper I will explore some of the ways in which the myths created
from and through games generate meaning. People experience myths in games very similarly to
how they might in religion. I will first explain what myth means in contemporary literature and
then show how the very make up of games opens them to a mythical reality. I highlight two ways
in particular. I will argue that the inefficiencies within games promote a deep engagement with
the world, and this gratuitous nature provides a system for creating myths and actualizing
mythical potential.
In this paper I use the term games instead of sports even though most of my examples are
of sports. Although I am idealizing sports by using them as examples, the focus of this paper
falls intentionally on games and myth. Most scholars see sports as a subset of games. I will argue
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that games in general have great mythical potential to humanity, but my examples are of sports
because they are among the most popular examples of games and they may be the best way of
demonstrating the mythical potential to which I will speak.3
Conceptions of Myth
Popular conceptions of myth are largely negative. For instance, we use the term “myth”
pejoratively in one way as we speak of commonly held misconceptions. That is, we “debunk
myths” or analyze the truth behind the misinformation we generally believe to be true. We also
describe myth as the way in which primitive societies attempted to make sense of that which they
did not understand. Since they could not accurately predict or control the weather, they tried to
appease the rain gods during droughts by performing ritual dances. Since they could not
understand illness or injury, they propitiated the gods or elders of their tribes with offerings,
incense, chants, or sacrifices. As our societies have modernized we believe that we have taken a
more scientific (i.e., less mythical, in our minds) viewpoint to develop what seem to be more
plausible explanations of the world.
However, most scholars argue that myth is still a part of our lives.4 To this day, as the
argument goes, we create myths to help us understand the world especially at the macro level –
such as theories about the beginning of time and about the galaxy – and at the micro level –
including ideas about human genetic make-up and molecular composition. We also use myth in
many ways to help us establish and understand cultural views. In the nineteenth century, Great
Britain believed that, while many of its colonial citizens could play cricket, only the white, male
gentry could successfully captain an elite team in such a strategic, nuanced, and genteel sport.
Many religious scholars have developed broad understandings of myth that promote the
value of what is popularly regarded as mere fables, tales, or legends. Instead of seeing them
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simply as ideas that fill the gaps in our knowledge or stories that speak to that which we cannot
prove, many scholars believe that they contain deeper meaning. Philosopher Ernst Cassirer
argues that “the real substratum of myth is not a substratum of thought but of feeling.”5 That is,
myths may not have robust logical coherency or consistency when compared to science or socalled “enlightened thought.” Rather, they indicate a deep and discriminative sympathy or
general sense about what is good, right, and true – a sentiment of life. In this sense, myths are not
just ways to fill in the gaps of our knowledge of the world as we often believe them to be; instead
they hold embedded truths that humans perpetuate because they have felt or experienced them.
William James refers to this felt presence within his notion of the “sentiment of
rationality.” He states, “It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a
feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call ‘something there,’ more deep
and more general than any of the particular ‘senses’,” by which we rationally come to understand
reality.6 This felt presence indicates that much of our perception of reality comes from that which
we cannot attribute to one or another of our senses.
Part of this sentiment-oriented description of myth is based on the feelings, stories, and
culture that get passed down through generations. Religious historian Mircea Eliade explains
myth, along these lines, as paradigmatic behavior. He argues that “it is in the myth that the
principles and paradigms for all conduct must be sought and recovered.”7 In other words, myths
help us understand how we should or should not act in certain circumstances. Historically
speaking, mythical figures and personas have influenced much of our perception of ideal
behavior. Hercules set the standard for strength and courage; Icarus provided caution against
hubris; the apostle Peter was “the Rock,” or the disciplined and determined disciple to whom
Jesus gave great responsibility; and Gandhi provided the framework from which we understand
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the merits of patience and persistence. Even myths as trivial as those related to the
compassionate frontiersman Johnny Appleseed or the determined lumberjack Paul Bunyan
helped instill an emerging American nation with an identity built around collective values.
In his book on the religious experience of college football in the southern United States,
Eric Bain-Selbo argues a similar point that is more specific to games. He claims that
“Southerners emphasized and continue to emphasize feeling … in the rituals of college football.”
Specifically, they had and often have a myth-induced “sentimental orientation” that differs from
ordinary “rational discourse” and expresses a general sense of their worldviews in no less real
ways. Therefore, Bain-Selbo explains that the way one feels about a situation can be very
important and meaningful in a person’s understanding of the truths embedded in the particular
context – American college football, in this case.8
Michael Polanyi builds on these ideas by clarifying the value and meaning structure of
myths. He explains that a myth is “an expansion of the mind.”9 It is, in essence, something that
augments the rational discourse that often marks our epistemological boundaries. As such,
Polanyi claims that a myth requires imagination. But this imagination is more than simple
daydreaming or child’s play. Imagination requires a type of intelligence that can sense or feel
connections among things even if those connections are not explicit. It takes imagination to sense
the truths that are embedded in such myths as performing a collective dance in the presence of
elders to bring rainfall needed to grow crops; Icarus’ wax wings melting from his vain and
careless attempt to fly too close to the sun; and the belief that our galaxy is one of many
throughout the solar system. In a similar way, it takes imagination to sense the truths that are
embedded in Pheidippides’ run from the Battle of Marathon to Athens in ancient Greece and
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collapsing to his death as he delivered a message of victory;10 or in Muhammad Ali “shocking
the world” by knocking out Sonny Liston in 1964.
Learning about these myths and believing them to have embedded truths puts us into an
intimate connection with what Polanyi calls the sacred world – or that which contains all value,
meaning, and reality in contrast to a mundane, profane world. By acknowledging myths, we
come to play a part in their perpetuation as meaningful explanations of the world as it is. The
manifold creation myths that emerge in cultures around the globe prove that this idea is
especially relevant. “He who recites or performs the origin myth is thereby steeped in the sacred
atmosphere in which these miraculous events took place,” Polanyi reaffirms in a quotation from
Eliade.11 Eliade also explains that “man becomes contemporary with the exploits that the Gods
[mythical characters] performed in illo tempore” – in that time.12 Through myth, one is brought
into intimate connection with the players of these sacred stories.
It seems that imagination, which Polanyi suggests is so important, is also prone to a
system of errors regarding myths.13 Over the course of time we have come to reject some myths
as outdated, erroneous, even laughable and thus Polanyi says that myths are controlled by
plausibility. He states that truth in myths “can only consist in their power to evoke in us an
experience which we hold to be genuine.”14 As we recite the feats of Pheidippides or Muhammad
Ali, we are implicitly expressing our belief that there are embedded truths to be found within
these embellished or hyperbolic stories. We want to find these truths because we know and
believe in the power of games and of those particular sports moments even though they may
include exaggerated elements. They reveal something deep within us that we identify as being
truly human. When we can integrate myths to our experiences they become plausible and, hence,
accepted. Even the most archaic and outdated myths, to Polanyi, maintain plausibility because
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they helped our ancestors understand and become more intimately acquainted with human
experiences in some way.
The plausibility of myths depends largely on our ability to integrate them into our
understanding of the world. Polanyi believes that we can integrate our experiences in two ways:
naturally and transnaturally.15 The former include our daily experiences of labor, tending to
necessity, and instrumentality. They are natural because once we have integrated them, they
work for us. We accept their plausibility without having to re-integrate them every time they
occur. Eating breakfast at home for nourishment to begin one’s day, going to a job to make
money, and going for a daily walk in the evening to maintain a particular body weight all fall
into this category. Transnatural integrations, on the other hand, include myths associated with
our experiences of phenomena that are often non-instrumental such as games, art, and music.
These integrations are transnatural because they detach us from our daily concerns. In Polanyi’s
view, transnatural integrations help us do this in part because of the rituals and ceremonies that
surround them. Rituals and ceremonies often prepare us to experience myth and understand its
meaning. These preparatory events serve as ways for us to facilitate our entrance into what he
refers to as the sacred world.16
Although rituals are a common part of religion or religious experience, they also seem to
have a direct connection to games. High school, college, and professional American football
games, for example, have a great deal of ritual and ceremony surrounding them every weekend
in the fall. Pep rallies, scouting reports, mass media pre-game shows, marching bands,
cheerleaders, team apparel, and tailgate parties all help us prepare to integrate our experiences of
these transnatural mythical events on the gridiron. In essence, they are the gateways into certain
transnatural integrations.
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Religion and ritual studies scholar Catherine Bell makes this idea explicit as she argues
that, “through a series of movements, gestures, and sounds,” rituals or ritual events “effectively
structure and nuance an environment.” While Bell speaks most directly about religious worship
or spirituality, it is easy to see how the ritual and ceremony surrounding sporting events “always
suggests the ultimate coherence of a cosmos in which one takes a particular place.” As coaches,
players, fans, and the media participate in pre-game rituals, they are definitively settling into
their roles as coaches, players, fans, and media members. Each role has a place in the game’s
“particular construction of power relationships, a particular relationship of domination, consent,
and resistance.” Games seem to embody these relationships as well as any corporate religious
worship.17
Suits’ Conception of Games
Transnatural integrations seem to be part of a different or sacred world. Many scholars
who have studied games have argued that they, also, are in some ways different from the rest of
our experiences. This argumentation parallels Polanyi’s natural vs. transnatural integrations and
Eliade’s profane vs. sacred world, for instance.18 Suits, notably, began this discussion as he
argued that games are distinct from our workaday world in specific ways and that game-playing
constitutes the ideal of human existence. Suits explains that games have four necessary and
sufficient characteristics – goals, means, rules, and the lusory attitude.19
It is this last characteristic, the lusory attitude, which helps us see how games are
transnatural integrations (after all, many ordinary activities have goals, means, and rules).
Regardless of the many other reasons one may have for participating in a game, Suits argues that
a “game-player” must be in the mindset to accept the unnecessarily difficult means and rules of
the game problem or challenge no matter how inefficient they may be. Whereas in our non-game
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behavior we generally strive and are rewarded for efficiency, in games we voluntarily accept
inefficient means as the challenge to reach an often arbitrary goal.20 Inefficiency is not the goal,
though. Rather it is the vehicle that gives us unnecessary difficulties. Consequently, the lusory
attitude that game-players take on that accepts the inefficiency and unnecessary difficulties helps
to separate the workaday or efficiency mindset from the mindset we bring to what Eliade and
Polanyi would refer to as a transnatural or sacred world – one in which we continually have
unique experiences that we must re-integrate into our lives.
The Gratuity of Games
Morgan and Kretchmar have described this phenomenon as the gratuitous logic of games.
In games, we artificially create problems in the face of which (to a certain extent) “harder is
better” and uncertainty is valued more than certainty.21 However, in our day-to-day lives, making
our tasks harder and more uncertain would be counterproductive and, for that reason, absurd.
Typically, we want to be as efficient as possible to finish our work duties and chores.
Games are different in that they have inherent inefficiencies. To begin, we never have to
play games to survive. That is, while we have to eat, sleep, and work to provide for ourselves and
our families, we do not have to undertake unnecessary problems except when we (or someone
with some power over us like a parent, spouse, or friend) want to experience those problems.
When we participate in games, we are simply adding unnecessary challenges or problems to our
lives that are already replete with natural problems. Therefore games are inefficient in that they
make our lives unnecessarily challenging (albeit more meaningful and interesting, as well).
Next, even when we decide to participate in games (which we often do), there are also
inefficiencies in how we structure game problems or challenges. In baseball we direct the pitcher
to throw from an elevated mound. This makes hitting harder for the batter because gravity
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augments the velocity of the pitches. There is no reason for us to elevate the pitching mound
apart from wanting to experience the pitcher-batter relationship that baseball’s batting problems
present to us. We made baseball this way, we like it as such, and we want to continue with it in
this fashion. If we ever find that baseball becomes too easy for either the pitcher or batter, we
will change the height of the mound or alter some other inefficient or arbitrary variable until we
have a relationship that fits better. Such is the process of gamewrighting – of inventing,
modifying, and preserving gratuitous problems.
Similarly, it seems arbitrary to have a basketball hoop placed ten feet above the floor. But
this is a height that fosters a healthy degree of difficulty in our shooting. No one has perfected
shooting to the extent that it has become too easy.22 On the flip side of the coin, everyone who
has the physical capacity to get the ball above the rim has a chance to make some shots. This is
part of the uncertainty that makes basketball a durably attractive problem. We have found a
degree of difficulty that seems just right. We preserve that difficulty or inefficiency for
gratuitous reasons – that is, just so we can go back to basketball and experience the problem it
presents over and over again.
Gratuity, or the underlying logic behind what Suits referred to as the lusory attitude, sets
game behavior apart from other behaviors we normally engage in. Two particular distinctions
may indicate how this is so. The first distinction is the most obvious. Many things we do in life
involve means and ends – including games – but games are different in that they are artificially
and often somewhat arbitrarily contrived to be challenging and uncertain. Instrumental activities,
for instance, need to be done (with some level of proficiency) in order for us to ensure our
survival and so we often want to get them done without any extra difficulty or inefficiency. In
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games, on the other hand, we build in difficulty or inefficiency so that we can experience the
challenge of overcoming the unnecessary problem.
So in games we have an intentionally suboptimal relationship between the means and
ends. However, games are not the only activities that include this type of built-in inefficiency.
Some utilitarian activities have suboptimal means or ends just like games. Civil codes such as
automobile speed limits or national citizenship tests, and social etiquette such as minding one’s
manners are similar to games in that they have elements that are artificially or arbitrarily
contrived. Simply, these arbitrary activities could be different from what they are, but we have
created them as such and we seem to like them that way. In other words, we have created games,
civil codes, and social etiquette the way they are for a reason. Our lives would be more efficient
if we drove faster, did not express gratitude or other gracious attitudes, and even used thicker
bats in baseball, but we have curbed the means or required extra hurdles in these activities for
good reasons. We have made pragmatic decisions regarding the amount of inefficiency we
believe is best. Suits, when describing the pragmatism in game inefficiency, explains this point
that could be taken along with other suboptimal activities as he says, “the decision to draw an
arbitrary line with respect to permissible means [or, we could say, required inefficiencies] need
not itself be an arbitrary decision … For both that the lines are drawn and also where they are
drawn have important consequences not only for the type, but also for the quality, of the game
[or, we could say, civil code, or social etiquette].”23
Herein lays the second distinction between game behavior and other activities in which
we participate. While games are not our only suboptimal activities, the reason for nonoptimization in games differs from that of, say, civil codes and social etiquette. These
inefficiencies can be either grounded in consequentialism or in gratuity. The inefficiencies in
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games are undertaken just so one can have the experience thereby produced by the roadblock –
gratuitous inefficiencies. The roadblocks embedded in civil codes or social etiquette are
undertaken to promote safe, healthy, and otherwise helpful behavior – consequential
inefficiencies. When we are told to obey the speed limit we naturally understand the importance
of this roadblock – safety. Similarly, when we are told to thank someone who helps us we
naturally understand the importance of this (small) roadblock – social civility. However, when
we are told in basketball that we are not allowed to step on the out of bounds line we understand
the importance of this roadblock differently – it allows us to experience the unnecessary
constraints and challenges of the game of basketball.
Thus, there are two kinds of rule-governed inefficiency—consequential and gratuitous.
While we may have any number of reasons for abiding by the consequential roadblocks of
roadway speed limits or being polite, for instance, the sine qua non is that we are told or taught
that the acceptance of these activities will promote greater public safety on the roads or a greater
respect for humanity. Accordingly, we might undertake the gratuitous roadblocks of the game of
golf for any number of reasons but one of them must be “just so the activity made possible by
such acceptance can occur” – the lusory attitude.24 We abide by civil codes and social etiquette
for safety and dignity, but we participate in golf to experience golf’s gratuitous challenges.
Although civil codes and social etiquette have some arbitrary elements, we follow their
inefficiencies because we want as much certainty as possible that we will be safe, healthy, and
treated with respect (even though it does not always happen). Although many rules of golf are
arbitrary, we follow its inefficiencies so we can experience the uncertainty of the artificial
challenges of golf – will I play well or not? Can I score par? How will my score relate to those of
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my foursome? These and other similar questions are what draw us in to the game and the
uncertainty they articulate is part of the foundation for the meaning structures within our games.
Connecting Game Gratuity and Myths
Gratuity accounts for much of the attraction we find in games. We love solving problems
or attempting to overcome challenges that are harder than they have to be and, consequently,
have outcomes that are not pre-determined. We seem to enjoy the difficulties and attendant
uncertainties that make our non-utilitarian games transnatural integrations. Why would we
choose to swim across pools, lakes, or channels when boats and rafts are readily available? Why
would we prohibit the use of hands in soccer when it is much easier to put the ball in the goal
with them? In fact, why should we even go chase a ball for ninety minutes anyway when we
could sit at home and watch well paid players do the same thing on a high-definition television?
The answer is that in our games we have created gratuitous problems to solve that are attractive
and challenging. We enjoy the drama of uncertain outcomes. We do not know if we can
overcome game obstacles or not but it is often satisfying and otherwise meaningful to try.
Gratuity demonstrates that games present an opportunity for deep engagement with the
world because they fulfill part of our humanity as problem solvers. When we encounter
problems, we try to solve them. In the absence of problems, we create new ones. Such is the case
with the invention of games. They expand our domain of problems. We have created games for
our participation, and we have created them in ways that fit our needs. Games do not have to be
the way they are but, as their inventors and sustainers, we like them that way. They allow us to
exercise our capabilities more readily. In other words, we have made them practical and
accessible. Since we are runners, jumpers, throwers, and thinkers, we have created gratuitous
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problems that allow us to run, jump, throw, and think. If our everyday lives come up short on
natural problems that require running, jumping, throwing, and thinking, we add to them.
Some scholars have argued that, although humans have been described as homo ludens
(man who plays),25 homo religious may also appropriately depict natural human impulses.26 In
other words, although we are runners, jumpers, throwers, and thinkers, we are also more
specifically spiritual thinkers or religion-seekers. We spend time wrestling with ideas about
creation, transcendence, the afterlife, and the supernatural. In this way, we are also solving
problems, albeit problems of a different type than many of our games. Clearly, we seek to solve a
broad variety of problems in our lives.
Our desire to solve problems is driven by our fundamental desire to escape or to live in
what Eliade refers to as “Great Time.” “Great” or “Sacred” Time is that at which the Sacred first
appears. The primitive groups that Eliade had in mind were concerned with origins and
beginnings. They created myths about the Sacred and the first presence of the Sacred that
ordered all things. The only things, Eliade argues, that have value, then, are those having to do
with the myths explaining the Sacred. For modern groups, the ways to have value are to imitate
or re-play (that is, participate in anew) the original value- and meaning-producing mythical
events that explained the presence of the Sacred.
Religious worship provides one avenue whereby modern groups imitate mythical events
and thereby invoke Sacred or Great Time in the midst of normal, mundane “historic time” (that
which occurs during the normal course of history). This is the perpetuation of homo religious—
people seeking the Sacred, meaning, and value by repeatedly imitating liturgical elements of
religion and worship. Games serve the same purpose in our lives. Occasionally, we become
bored or discontent with “historic time” and thus try to solve problems or copy the archetypes of
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mythical behavior in existing forms of gratuitous behavior—homo ludens. We imitate or re-play
activities that have great meaning and value in part because of their inefficiency, uncertainty, and
difficulty—their gratuity.27 In essence, games help us transcend our own local time and live in
illo tempore—Eliade’s “Great Time” or, relatedly, experiencing Polanyi’s transnatural
integrations.
As transnatural integrations in which we continually integrate new or novel experiences
of “Great Time” into our existing worldviews, games are experientially connected to myth as a
deep engagement in the world at two levels of understanding. The first is that games are myths
about human limits in the world. The second is that games have become, or have generated, their
own myths.
Games as Myths about Human Limits in the World
Games highlight human abilities in the natural world. Games are gratuitous activities in
which we test or challenge the limits of humanity. Ancient wrestling tested the limits of human
strength and might. We hear tales of cunning Odysseus wrestling the barrel-chested Ajax, of
Jacob wrestling an angel, of Hercules taking down a bull, and of Andre the Giant pinning
opponents of all sizes in the World Wrestling Federation. When we wrestle now, we are, in many
ways, in the process of determining how strong we are in relation to these and other past
wrestling feats. In doing so, we try to push the limits of human strength and power with regards
to the lore of wrestling or the benchmarks that have been established by the wrestling
community. Within most sporting communities we have accumulated records that have
quantified the benchmarks that have been set by the gods of the communities—the myths of that
community’s Sacred Time.
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Games mythologize human limits in the world by fitting both our abilities and our
surroundings. By fitting our abilities, games are myths that display those actions of which we are
capable. We have built games that are challenging and feature the use of our bodies – two arms,
two legs, two lungs, elbow joints, hip joints, opposable thumbs, brains with frontal lobes, and so
on.28 These physical and mental characteristics allow us to interact with the world in certain
ways.
Historically, we have used our bodies in a variety of ways. Throughout the course of
time, many ancient people used their bodies and abilities prudently – that is, in ways that focused
on survival and communication. They prepared and repaired their bodies to carry out workrelated duties and develop conventional means of expressing themselves to each other. Ancient
gamewrights, on the other hand, utilized human bodies by presenting gratuitous challenges. They
threw spears for distance instead of for food, ran for speed instead of away from predators, and
wrestled for submission instead of for survival. These challenges allowed us to determine our
individual abilities, how we stack up against others, and how we can interact with the world in
less-threatening and often more meaningful ways. In other words, in games we began to reveal
ourselves to ourselves.
By fitting our surroundings, games are myths that display how we are tied to our location.
We have built games that make use of the natural phenomena we encounter such as open fields,
water, wood, animals, and wind, to name a few. When we participate in games, we come to
understand how to interact with these natural features. Throughout time, we have also done this
in different ways. Many ancient people made sense of bodies of water, mountains, and forests by
treating them as powerful animate entities that could be dangerous if enraged and provide if
revered or assuaged. Ancient gamewrights, on the other hand, made sense of water, mountains,
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and forests by presenting gratuitous challenges – arbitrarily or inefficiently racing across them,
taking a more difficult route up them, and finding obstacles to overcome while trekking through
them. It was no wonder that ancient authors tapped into these activities as they mythologized
characters such as Hercules, Odysseus, Gilgamesh and many more. Gamewrights created
activities that mythologized human needs, abilities, and surroundings. If we did not have the
abilities that we do and if we did not have the surroundings that we do, then we would have
constructed different games that fit those other needs, abilities, and surroundings.
Games as Activities with Mythical Potential
The second level of understanding by which games connect to myth is that games have
become their own myths. As primitive running, swimming, throwing, and jumping challenges
evolved into games with more complex conventions, these new activities took on an intrinsic
interest of their own. That is to say, we created games with mythical potential. Our games not
only perpetuate the myths of the limits of human powers, but gaming experiences have their own
mythical possibilities. Since our well-established and popular games are intrinsically interesting,
we often refer to our recent gaming experiences in terms of previous mythologized
performances.
Bain-Selbo comments on this process of mythicization by saying that we often assimilate
historical personages “to a pre-existing mythical model. For example, stories of the superior
strength of an athlete may entail comparison to Hercules.” In many cases, when we look at the
mythology of a particular community, a multitude of mythical heroes emerge in some sort of
hierarchy. As such, Bain-Selbo explains that not all mythical heroes have to be “legendary”
figures. Oftentimes, stories about excellent, noteworthy, or in some way admirable feats by
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otherwise ordinary people are passed on or circulated and slowly become exaggerated over
time.29
Games present wonderful opportunities for the mythicization process to develop. Our
most popular games have among them what Alisdair MacIntyre calls “practice communities”
that help promote the qualities of behavior that are worthy of mythicization or heroization.30 The
leaders or stakeholders in these communities are among those who identify behavior worthy of
myth and perpetuate the feats through hyperbolic interpretation and dissemination. Many of our
most popular games have extensive media and marketing networks and large and far-reaching
fan bases that allow for the often embellished nature and widespread dissemination of myths.
Through the passing down of myths from one generation to the next, we realize a general
human tendency to create archetypes out of the lives or stories of exemplary individuals. Many
religions facilitate this idea – Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, among others – and many
games provide the same types of paradigms. Accordingly, we learn games and practice them by
striving to actualize a lifestyle or behavior that has already been achieved by a mythical hero of a
particular game – Eliade’s paradigmatic understanding of myth. We push toward the finish line
with confidence, knowing that others before us have done it from longer distances and with
greater speed. We push on in our practice or training sessions because we know that this is what
our heroes went through over and over again before they became our heroes.
In many ways, ultra-marathon runner and biology professor, Bernd Heinrich, aptly
identifies a vital sentiment in myth-making as he describes his running experiences by saying,
“the real reason my high school and college running mates and I saw [our boyhood heroes] as
heroes was that we secretly believed we were elementally equal. We were convinced that if we
only tried, if we did what they did, then we too would rank among the gods.”31 And who were
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these gods? They were idolized athletes, and we mythologize their stories because they are who
we want to become. Joseph Campbell describes the “standard path” of these “gods”—heroes
who are elementally equal—by saying, “A hero ventures forth from the world of common day
into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive
victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow
boons on his fellow man.”32 These “boons” often come in the form of inspiration and confidence.
Eliade explains this confidence that myths elicit in those who aspire to match the feats of
their heroes as he says, “myth assures man that what he is about to do has already been done.”33
A game player can enter the field or court with the confidence that he is in a position to follow
the example of mythical heroes of the past and, in many ways, participate in their activities on
their sacred turf – in illo tempore. Young baseball players in sandlots dream of being able to
“call their shot” like Babe Ruth. Recreational basketball players long for the shooting touch of
Steph Curry because that allows them to feel as if they have had an experience with the gods in
their world – in illo tempore.
Clearly, games have a high potential for developing and perpetuating their own myths.
Game participants often find inspiration, training techniques, and behavior models from the
myths that have been passed down to them. Yet the mythical potential in games should be
understood in a broader context and to a wider audience than just game participants. Those who
are a part of MacIntyrean practice communities can become engaged in the mythical potential of
their games whether they are participating or not. That is, fans or spectators can facilitate the
mythicization process just as easily as participants.
Part of the emotional buildup or the actualization of the broadly experienced mythical
potential of games has to do with what Jean Baudrillard refers to as the “spiritual duel.”34 The
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spiritual duel in a game is a moment or matchup that we long for and hope to see because it can
be so pivotal or so exemplary of the mythical power in games. A spiritual duel occurs because of
the anticipation for the matchup when the star right wing meets up with the stalwart left back in
football; when an elite performer finally overcomes a personal weakness to win a title; when
cross-town rivals meet at the end of a scholastic sports season; and when the ace pitcher meets
the homerun slugger in baseball. The buildup for these spiritual duels may occur throughout a
player’s career or even just within one match. Sometimes these encounters occur multiple times
in each game and sometimes they rarely occur, but they embody the climax or the actualization
of the emotional buildup that is so characteristic of our most popular games.
The spiritual duel often exists internally. Many films have romanticized the idea of
overcoming something within oneself to become a champion. Yet spiritual duels more
commonly exist among two or more of our heroes or teams, or those game participants whom we
have mythologized. We can watch them throughout each game, but we know that when we see
them in a spiritual duel we are likely to see something great happen. That is, we are likely to be
in the presence of the next mythicized event. And even though it may not always occur at the end
or the ludic culmination of a really close and tightly contested game, it still may be the emotional
climax of the game or what most people remember in posterity. And seeing it firsthand gives the
spectator an opportunity to connect with the game on a deeply meaningful and spiritual level.
Conclusion
Game activities highlight the naturally occurring world and test human limits. As such,
we are drawn to them as myth-making activities. Games also have mythical potential that comes
from their nature as gratuitous activities. As we created artificial, arbitrary and inefficient
challenges that we voluntarily undertook, we realized that what we were really doing was testing
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human limits in the world. And as we did so, we came to hero-ize or mythologize the individuals
who have been most successful in these tests.
Spirituality pervades games through the gratuity that is part of their nature. The
challenges that are unnecessary and, therefore, chosen for their own sake and the uncertainty of
outcomes and performances provides games with a meaning structure that parallels that which
we experience in religion or religious worship. We imitate the heroes or gods within certain
game or religious communities that help us recognize when we experience Sacred Time—the
transnatural integrations that produce our myths. In so doing, we accept the heroes’ behavior as
paradigmatic or exemplary, and we imitate them in games when we take the same artificial tests
over and over again. This cycle continues until we have new heroes who present slight variations
on existing paradigms. As this happens, the myths of games are perpetuated and the mythical
potential of games grows.
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